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Abstract 
A simulation model of international tourist flows is used to estimate the impact of including 
carbon dioxide emissions from aviation fuels in the European Trading System. The effect on 
global carbon dioxide emissions from international aviation is minimal: -0.01% at current 
permit prices, and –0.13% for the aggressive climate policy advocated by the Stern Review. In 
the latter case, total CO2 emissions from fossil fuels would fall by 0.004%, and total greenhouse 
gas emissions by 0.002%. Tourist numbers in Europe would fall by up to 0.6%, and would 
increase in the rest of the world. If the permits are grandparented, the airlines would receive a 
subsidy of €3 bln at current prices, and €40 bln for the Stern policy. If permits are auctioned, 
the effect on the airline industry would be minimal. Including aviation in the market for 
emission permits has almost no effect on the environment and may have a negative effect on 
the economy. 
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AIRLINE EMISSIONS OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN THE EUROPEAN TRADING 
SYSTEM 
 
1. Introduction 
Carbon dioxide emissions from international aviation are small but growing much faster than 
other greenhouse gas emissions. To date, aviation emissions have been excluded from climate 
policy, inter alia because it is an international industry regulated by consensus. Recently, 
however, the European Commission has announced that aviation emissions will be part of the 
European Trading System (ETS) for carbon dioxide. Specifically, permits will be needed for 
all emissions from flights from and to an airport in the European Union.1 This note 
investigates the implications for emissions, for travel patterns, and for the financial position of 
airlines. 
This note builds on Tol (forthcoming). That paper was written when taxing aviation emissions 
was a remote prospect, and the policy scenarios there differ from the current policy proposals 
– particularly, the previous paper considers a global tax, while the current paper studies a 
European permit trade. Similarly, Michaelis (1997), Olsthoorn (2001) and Wit et al. (2002) 
analyse different policies than what is currently being proposed. 
The paper only considers international aviation demand by tourists. Domestic air travel is 
excluded, as is travel for business purposes. There is a global database of reasonable quality 
on international tourist travel – but there is nothing of the sort for domestic tourist travel or for 
business travel. So, a choice has to be made between comprehensiveness in a geographic 
sense, and comprehensiveness in a travel sense. The current paper opts for the former, which 
of course does not make the latter less relevant. Note that business travellers are less likely to 
respond to price changes than are tourists. 
The paper only considers shifts in demand induced by an increase in the price of air travel. Of 
course, carbon pricing would also induce changes in flight behaviour, aircraft technology, and 
perhaps fuel choice – each of which would reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Bates et al., 
2000; Wit et al., 2002, 2005; Wulff and Hourmouziadis, 1997). This would dampen the price 
signal to the traveller, so that this model overestimates the economic impacts but 
underestimates the effect on emissions. The results suggest that this is not a major problem. 
Note that aircraft and fuel are fixed in the short-term. Airport authorities and air control 
determine the most crucial aspects of flight behaviour – taxiing, take-off, and landing – 
although the airlines pay for the emissions; little change is expected, therefore. 
 
2. The model 
Simulations are done with the Hamburg Tourism Model (HTM), version 1.3. Previous work 
focussed on climate change (Hamilton et al., 2005a,b; Bigano et al., 2005). The current 
version is designed to analyse climate policy (Tol, forthcoming). 
HTM predicts the numbers of domestic and international tourists from 207 countries, and 
traces the international tourists to their destinations. Tourism demand is primarily driven by 
per capita income. Destination choice is driven by income, climate, coast, and travel time and 
cost. Carbon pricing would increase the travel cost, but leave other factors unaffected. See Tol 
(forthcoming) for details. 
Data were primarily taken from WTO (2003) and EuroMonitor (2002). Behavioural 
relationships were estimated for 1995 (the most recent year with reasonably complete data 
                                                 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/aviation_en.htm 
 2 
coverage), and used to interpolate the missing observations. Observations on travel time and 
travel cost are very limited. Here, travel time and cost are assumed to be linear in the distance 
between airports, using data for Heathrow, Europe’s busiest airport. The airfare elasticity of 
destination choice equals –1.50 +0.14lny, where y is the average per capita income in the 
country of origin. For UK travellers, the elasticity equals –0.45, which compares well to the 
estimates of Oum et al. (1990), Crouch (1995), Witt and Witt (1995) and Wohlgemuth 
(1997). 
The model was used to “predict” tourist numbers for 1980, 1985, and 1990, and shown to 
have a predictive power of well above 70%. 
Carbon dioxide emissions equal 6.5 kg C per passenger for take-off and landing, and 0.02 kg 
per passenger-kilometre (Pearce and Pearce, 2000). No holidays at less than 500 km distance 
(one way) are assumed to be by air, and all holidays beyond 5000 km are assumed to be by 
air; in between the fraction increases linearly with distance. For island nations, the respective 
distance are 0 and 500 km. Total modelled emissions in 2000 are 140 million metric tonnes of 
carbon, which is 2.1% of total emissions from fossil fuels. This is from tourism only. Total 
international aviation is responsible for some 3% of global emissions.2 There are no published 
numbers on the share of tourism in total international travel. 
 
3. Scenarios and Results 
 
3.1. Scenarios 
The model was calibrated for 1995. From 1995 to 2004, populations and economies grow as 
observed. Between 2005 and 2020, growth rates gradually converge to the SRES A1 scenario 
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2001). The price of oil is kept constant at the price in September 
2006. Results are presented for 2010 only, and in deviations from the baseline, so that the 
baseline details are largely irrelevant. 
Eight different prices of carbon permits are considered, all in euro per tonne of carbon: 0, 5, 
10, 18, 25, 50, 100, and 240 €/tC; 0 €/tC is the base case; 5 €/tC (25 €/tC) corresponds to the 
median in Tol’s (2005) meta-analysis of the marginal damage cost of carbon for a 3% (1%) 
pure rate of time preference; 240 €/tC is the value recommended by Stern et al. (2006); 18 
€/tC was the price of carbon permits in the ETS at January 5, 2007; 10, 50 and 100 €/tC are 
round numbers in between. 
Following the proposal by the European Commission, permits are assumed to be needed for 
all emissions from flights to and from any airport in the European Union. Norway has 
announced it will join, while Iceland and Switzerland are assumed to follow suit. People 
residing in the European Union account for 19% of all tourism aviation emissions. However, 
emissions on flights to and from the EU account for 58% of global emissions. The difference 
is because Europe is a popular holiday destination for people from all over the world, and 
tourists from outside the EU fly longer distances. Note that airlines have questioned the 
jurisdiction of the European Commission. 
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3.2. Emissions 
Figure 1 shows the effect of carbon dioxide emissions trading. The change in global CO2 
emissions is approximately linear in the permit price. This is no surprise if one considers the 
scale of change in emissions: Global emissions from international tourism aviation fall by less 
than 0.14% if the permit price is 240 €/tC. If the price of permits is as it was in early January 
of 2007, emissions fall by 0.01%. For emissions by EU residents, the respective numbers are 
0.28% and 0.02%. 
 
3.3. Tourist numbers 
The change in international arrivals in the European Union is larger than the change in 
emissions, as non-EU tourists choose the fly to other destinations. Still numbers are small, 
less than a 0.6% drop. The reduction in tourist numbers is not evenly spread in Europe. 
Peripheral island nations such as Cyprus, Malta, and Ireland see the largest reductions (-
1.16%, -1.04% and –0.90%, for 240 €/tC). Slovakia (-0.43%) is affected least – generally, 
central countries that can also be reached by car or train face below-average impacts. 
Countries outside the EU would attract more tourists – the number of European tourists would 
fall only slightly as these tourists pay for their carbon emissions wherever they go, but tourists 
from China, Japan and the USA would be diverted from Europe to other countries. Nepal and 
South Korea gain more than 1% for a 240 €/tC permit price. 
 
3.4. Airlines 
HTM does not explicitly include airline behaviour, but the observed behaviour of power 
utilities in the current ETS may be a good analogue for what will happen in the air travel 
market. As demand is price inelastic, the costs of carbon permits are by and large passed on to 
electricity consumers. This is because the effect on the price of electricity is too small to have 
much effect on competition. In air travel, the price effect is even smaller, while airlines’ 
emissions are more homogenous so that the competition effect is smaller too. It is therefore 
safe to assume that the price of permits will be passed on to the travellers. 
Currently, permits are grand-parented in the ETS, that is, companies receive their permits for 
free; and the amount of permits is proportional to the emissions in a base year. To date, 
allocated permits are in fact almost equal to the expected emissions in the target year – the 
basic reason why the permit price is so low. 
Under these assumptions, Figure 2 shows the value of the grandparented permits to the airline 
industry as a function of the permit price. At the permit price of early January 2007, the 
airline industry would be given assets with a total value of €3.0 billion per year. At the permit 
price advocated by Stern et al. (2006), the subsidy would amount to €39.6 billion. In 
comparison, the US industry received a hand-out of €1.9 billion in response to the 9/11 
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.3 
An annual subsidy of this size to incumbents would increase the barriers to entry for new 
airlines. Grandparenting similarly rewards slow-growing airlines at the expense of fast-
growing ones. Low-cost carriers face a proportionally higher price increase than other 
carriers. These three effects imply a reduction in competition in the air travel market. As 
taxiing, take-off and landing are more energy-intensive than cruising, tradable permits hit 
companies that specialise in short-haul flights relatively harder than companies that specialise 
in long-haul flights. 
                                                 
3 The Economist, September 15, 2005. 
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If carbon permits were auctioned rather than grandparented, the airline industry would not 
receive the wind-fall discussed above. Instead, the money would flow to the government. If 
the government spends that money wisely or cuts taxes, then this corresponds to a 
redistribution of a relatively small amount of money from air travellers to the general public. 
 
3.5. Airports 
European airports would see a reduction in number of travellers. As discussed above, the 
changes in the number of tourists to and from Europe are very small. However, the number of 
transiting passengers may fall more substantially. Under the proposed rules, emission permits 
are needed for the entire trip New York-Frankfurt-Johannesburg, but none for the longer trip 
New York-Dubai-Johannesburg. Similarly, a trip London-Dubai-Sydney would require less 
carbon permits than a trip London-Singapore-Sydney, but emit more CO2. Over the longer 
term, hubs may develop just beyond the European Union -- as Switzerland has not entered 
into the ETS, Zurich International Airport may be that hub. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
In sum, including aviation emissions in the European Trading System for carbon dioxide 
appears to be neither effective nor efficient. Of course, the first best solution for an emission 
reduction policy is to have a permit market that covers all emissions, including those from 
aviation. However, the current market is partial, and including aviation should not be the first 
priority for extending market coverage. The effect on emissions is minimal, even if the permit 
price reaches heights that are inconceivable today. If this were the only drawback, one may 
dismiss the inclusion of aviation emissions in the ETS as largely irrelevant, but a step in the 
right direction. However, in the current regime of grandparenting permits, this policy is in fact 
tantamount to a substantial subsidy to the airline industry – at the expense of travellers and 
without perceptible gains for the environment. European politicians would create the 
impression of leadership on climate policy while in fact contributing almost nothing to 
emission reduction. 
The results presented here are uncertain and require substantial caveats. A sensitivity analysis 
on the many assumptions is not given. However, Tol (forthcoming) shows that the sensitivity 
of the results is less than an order of magnitude – even if the impact of carbon pricing on 
emissions were ten times larger, it would still be very small. The lack of technological and 
behavioural responses in the model seems to be the most significant omissions – but the stock 
of aircraft turns over only very slowly, while taxiing, take-off and landing behaviour is in fact 
not affected by the proposed carbon pricing. Therefore, including aviation emissions in the 
ETS will, at best, have no effect on emissions and, at worst, have no effect on emissions but 
give a handsome subsidy to the airlines. 
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Figure 1. Emissions as a function of permit price. 
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Figure 2. Subsidy to the airline industry as a function of permit price. 
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